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La respuesta de la macroeconomía frente a la crisis económica resucitó antiguos debates sobre la 
utilidad de las políticas monetarias y fiscales para combatir una recesión. Sin la posibilidad de 
seguir reduciendo la tasa de interés, las autoridades de muchos países han recurrido a políticas 
fiscales expansivas. La literatura reciente argumenta que en tales condiciones el gasto de gobierno 
puede ser muy eficaz. Pero un elemento esencial de los paquetes de estímulos en todos los países 
fue el financiamiento del déficit y una reducción tributaria. Este documento explora el rol de la 
deuda de gobierno y del déficit fiscal en una economía restringida por el límite cero en la tasa de 
interés nominal. Dado que la trampa de la liquidez se origina en un gran aumento de la propensión a 
ahorrar del sector privado, el efecto riqueza del déficit puede constituir una respuesta central. Un 
gasto de gobierno financiado por déficit puede ser mucho más expansivo que un gasto financiado 
con alzas tributarias en un ambiente como el descrito. En una trampa de liquidez, un recorte 
tributario puede ser mucho más efectivo que en tiempos normales. Por último, una política 
monetaria orientada a aumentar directamente los agregados monetarios puede ser efectiva, aun sin 





The macroeconomic response to the economic crisis has revived old debates about the usefulness of 
monetary and fiscal policy in fighting recessions. Without the ability to further lower interest rates, 
policy authorities in many countries have turned to expansionary fiscal policies. Recent literature 
argues that government spending may be very effective in such environments.  But a critical 
element of the stimulus packages in all countries was the use of deficit financing and tax reductions. 
This paper explores the role of government debt and deficits in an economy constrained by the zero 
bound on nominal interest rates.  Given that the liquidity trap is generated by a large increase in the 
desire to save on the part of the private sector, the wealth effects of government deficits can provide 
a critical macroeconomic response to this. Government spending financed by deficits may be far 
more expansionary than that financed by tax increases in such an environment. In a liquidity trap, 
tax cuts may be much more effective than during normal times.  Finally, monetary policies aimed at 
directly increasing monetary aggregates may be effective, even if interest rates are unchanged. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The dramatic policy response to the 2008-2009 global economic crisis from many countries has revived 
some old debates about the use of fiscal and monetary policy in fighting recessions. The central dilemma for 
policy-makers in Japan, North America and Europe has been to try to counter a large recession brought on by 
an unprecedented fall in private consumption and investment spending, despite being constrained by their 
inability to lower nominal interest rates below their current near-zero level. The end result was an ad hoc 
series of fiscal and monetary measures: deficit-financed government spending increases, tax cuts, and 
“unconventional” monetary policy measures such as open market purchases on long-dated securities, direct 
increases in the monetary base, and so on. Coming under the catch-all term of  “stimulus-packages,” the 
design of these policies was not based on theoretical frameworks or quantitative macro-economic models of 
the kind explored within central banks over the past decade, but rather arose from “back-of-the-envelope” 
style arguments about the size of fiscal multipliers and the impact of liquidity injections on credit flows. 
At the same time, economists have vigorously debated the usefulness of fiscal and monetary stimulus at 
all.
1 One fact that has perhaps been less well recognized is that the central dilemma regarding economic 
policy options in a liquidity trap has been extensively studied within the recent vintage of New Keynesian 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, in light of Japan’s experience in the 1990s. Krugman 
(1998), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003,2005), Jung et al. (2005), Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005) and many 
other writers explored how to usefully employ monetary and fiscal policy, even when authorities have no 
further room to reduce short-term nominal interest rates. Recently, a number of authors have revived this 
literature, given very similar problems now affecting the economies of Western Europe and North America. 
Papers by Christiano et al. (2009) and Eggertsson (2009), Cogan et al. (2008) have explored the possibility of 
expanding government spending, applying tax cuts, and using monetary policy when the economy is in a 
“liquidity trap”. 
A key aspect fiscal and monetary policy effects in a liquidity trap that seems to have remained relatively 
unexplored to date is the role that government deficits and debt issue play, as part of a stimulus package. On 
the one hand, there has been overwhelming agreement among policy practitioners that to be useful, fiscal 
stimulus must be financed with debt, rather than compensating tax increases, and also that part of the stimulus 
could be based on tax cuts, rather than spending increases. But in most of the existing classes of New 
Keynesian DSGE models that examine fiscal and monetary policies in a liquidity trap, the distinction between 
tax-financed and debt-financed fiscal stimulus is irrelevant (as are tax cuts that leave the present taxation 
values unchanged), because these models are characterized by Ricardian equivalence, with infinitely lived 
consumers and infinite planning horizons. 
To offer a serious analysis of the role of fiscal stimulus in a liquidity trap, then, it would seem necessary 
to depart from the benchmark assumption of the infinitely lived Ramsey consumer. This paper takes a first 
step in this direction. Following several recent papers (such as, Annicchiarico et al. 2008), we amend the basic 
New Keynesian sticky price model of Woodford (2003) and Clarida Gali and Gertler (1999), by incorporating 
 
1 See for instance, Krugman (2009) and the response by Cochrane (2009). finite planning horizons in the manner of Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965). This means that debt-financed 
government spending has different effects than that financed by tax increases; that government debt itself has 
wealth effects for currently-alive households; that pure lump-sum tax cuts may be expansionary; and 
moreover, that monetary policy aimed at increasing the outstanding stock of monetary aggregates may have 
direct “real balance” effects, independently of its effect (or non-effect) on nominal interest rates. 
We explore the impacts of fiscal and monetary policy in this model, contrasting the results with the recent 
literature on policy in a liquidity trap. We focus on a scenario where a large increase in households’ desire to 
save pushes down the economy‘s underlying real interest rate and, in an economy with sticky prices, causes a 
fall in aggregate demand, output and inflation. 
To briefly summarize central results: we find that in an environment where monetary policy rules work 
“normally”, adjusting interest rates in response to inflation and output “gaps”, the introduction of finite 
planning horizons offers in terms of analyzing the impacts of fiscal policy and monetary policy shocks. When 
the model is calibrated to introduce empirically realistic planning horizons, there is little quantitative impact 
of the deviation from Ricardian equivalence. In our benchmark model, for instance, the “balanced budget” 
government spending multiplier is unity, and the multiplier implied by purely deficit-financed government 
spending is only slightly larger. 
By contrast, when policy is constrained by “a liquidity trap”, there may be a dramatic difference between 
the economy’s response with an effectively infinite planning horizon and that with a finite horizon. Likewise, 
the impact of deficit-financing within fiscal policies may be much greater than tax-financed policies. In our 
benchmark model, the balanced-budget government spending multiplier is also unity, even in a liquidity trap. 
But the multiplier for a deficit-financed government spending expansion is over 2. Intuitively, the model 
predicts that in a liquidity trap, government debt issue has substantial wealth effects, which stimulate 
aggregate demand and private consumption, playing an expansionary macroeconomic role, beyond the direct 
effects of government spending. 
Another perspective is as follows. In an economy with Ricardian equivalence and no capital, a large 
increase in the desire to save cannot be satisfied in equilibrium. In a flexible price world, we would simply see 
a fall in real interest rates. In a liquidity trap, where prices are sticky, the adjustment has to take place through 
a large fall in current output and consumption (see Christiano et al. 2009 for an explication of this argument). 
But in a world with finite horizon consumers, government debt issue in effect provides a vehicle for saving, 
on the part of the private sector. This satisfies part of the increase in their desire to save, and as a result, limits 
the degree to which aggregate demand and consumption has to fall. Indeed, our results suggest that during a 
liquidity trap, this macroeconomic role played by government-issued debt can contribute significantly within 
a fiscal stimulus package. 
We also show that the role of government debt issue is essentially equivalent, in our model, to the “real 
balance” effect in monetary expansion. As a corollary then, the model implies that this real balance effect may 
be negligible in normal times, but play a non-trivial role during a liquidity trap. Again, however, a key 
requirement for it to work is that Ricardian equivalence fails. 
  2The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly discusses the nature of fiscal and monetary 
policy responses to the recent crisis, followed by a section that develops the basic model used throughout this 
paper. Section 3 discusses the nature of the steady state in the model. Sections 4 and 5 outline the impact of 
government spending, tax, and debt shocks in the model when the economy is both outside and within a 


















1. FISCAL AND MONETARY RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS 
1.1  The Limits to Monetary Policy 
Following the collapse in economic activity across global economies in late 2008, monetary authorities in 
virtually all countries dramatically reduced interest rates. But by mid-2009, for most central banks, policy 
rates were close to their minimum feasible levels. Figure 1 describes the path of policy rates from mid-2008 in 
5 major economies. The US, the UK, Canada, and the European Central Bank (ECB) all reduced rates in 
September 2008. By the end of the year, the US Federal Funds rate was near zero. By mid-2009, the other 
three economies had rates at or below 1 percent. Japan of course, already had a policy rate below 1 percent, 
but reduced it further in early 2009. 
Reaching the limit of monetary policy traction through the interest rate channel, central banks engaged in 
a range of “unconventional” monetary policy strategies. The US Federal Reserve for instance, promising to 
"employ all available tools to promote economic recovery and to preserve price stability", began in late 2008 
to widen the range of counter-parties it would lend to, and accept a broader form collateral form of collateral, 
based on the assumption that the normal links between interest rates and credit expansion were failing to 
operate during the crisis. Later, the Fed directly intervened in long-term security markets, and by mid-2009 
had more than doubled the size of its balance sheet (Rudebusch, 2009). Similarly, in March 2009, the Bank of 
  3England began a policy of “Quantitative Easing”, involving the purchase of various government and corporate 
bonds.
2 The ECB has taken a range of similar measures. 
There is considerable skepticism about the effectiveness of this unconventional monetary policy, 
however. Evidence from Japan in the late 1990s provides little support for the idea that increasing available 
liquidity can stimulate credit flows to consumers and firms and thereby stimulate activity, holding the interest 
rate constant. Similarly, recent studies in the US suggest that, to be effective, quantitative easing would have 
to be much larger than even the recent Fed balance sheet expansions  (Krugman 2009). 
A final channel of monetary policy is communications and the targeting of expectations. Even if interest 
rates remain at zero for some time, the monetary authority can influence current conditions by announcing its 
intention to maintain low interest rates even after the recovery is underway. By doing so, the authority 
influences the private sector’s current spending decisions, to the extent that these are based on the projected 
path of interest rates into the future. Over the past year, this tool has played a key role in central bank 
communications strategies everywhere. 
 
Table 1 
 2009  stimulus  Total  Stimulus 
Country  % (2008) GDP  Tax Cut  % (2008) GDP  Tax Cut 
Argentina  1.3 0 1.3 0 
Australia  0.8 47.9 1.8 41.2 
Brazil  0.3 100 0.5 100 
Canada  1.5 40.4 2.8 45.4 
China  2.1 0 4.8 0 
France  0.7 6.5 0.7 6.5 
Germany 1.5 68 3.4 68 
India  0.5 0 0.5 0 
Indonesia  1.3 79 2.5 79 
Italy  0.2 0 0.3 0 
Japan  1.4 30 2.2 30 
Korea  1.4 17 2.7 17 
Mexico  1 0 1 0 
Russia  1.7 100 1.7 100 
Saudi  Arabia  3.3 0 9.4 0 
South  Africa  1.3 0 2.6 0 
Spain  1.1 36.7 4.5 36.7 
Turkey  0 N/A 0 N/A 
UK  1.4 73 1.5 73 
US  1.9 44 5.9  34.8 
Source: Prasad and Sorkin, 2009 
 
                                                 
2 See Céspedes, Chang, and Garcia-Cicco (2010) for a discussion of a range of ‘heterodox’ central bank policies. 
  41.2  Fiscal Stimulus Policies 
Since monetary policy has essentially reached the limit of its effectiveness, virtually all governments, in 
both advanced and emerging market economies, applied fiscal stimulus packages. Following the G20 
meetings in late 2008, in conjunction with IMF policy recommendations, a rough consensus emerged that 
fiscal stimulus should equal to 2% of GDP. There was no direct prescription for distributing this in terms of 
direct spending and tax cuts, however. Table 1 shows the composition of G20 economy stimulus packages. 
Expressed in terms of per capita GDP, after Saudi Arabia, China and the US provided the largest fiscal 
stimulus, at 5% and 6% of GDP, respectively. But the composition of these packages varied enormously, with 
China’s stimulus plan having no tax cut component at all, while in the US about a third of the overall stimulus 
took the form of tax cuts. Britain’s plan consisted mostly of tax cuts, while Russia’s and Brazil’s contained 
only tax cuts.  
Even without tax cuts, large increases in public sector deficits have financed all stimulus plans. Table 2 
illustrates pre-crisis and post-crisis (projected) fiscal balances for G-20 countries. The fiscal positions of many 
of these advanced economies were already weak in 2007, but over the past year, deficits dramatically 
increased in most, and are projected to remain well above pre-crisis trends, until at least 2014. Emerging 
economies were generally in a much better fiscal position before the crisis, but most have also seen their fiscal 
deficits rise significantly. 
 
Table 2. Overall Fiscal Balance as a Percentage of GDP 
Country 2007  2009  2010  2014 
Argentina -2.1  -3.9  -2.4  -1.7 
Australia 1.5  -4.3  -5.3  -1.1 
Brazil -2.8  -3.8  -1.2  -1.0 
Canada 1.6  -4.9  -4.1  0.0 
China 0.9  -3.9  -3.9  -0.8 
France -2.7  -8.3  -8.6  -5.2 
Germany -0.5  -4.2  -4.2  0.0 
India -1.2  -10.4  -10.0  -0.8 
Indonesia -1.2  -2.6  -2.1  -1.3 
Italy -1.5  -5.6  -5.6  -5.3 
Japan -2.5  -10.5  -10.2  -8.0 
Korea 3.5  -2.8  -2.7  2.6 
Mexico -1.4  -4.9  -3.7  -3.1 
Russia 6.81  -3.6  -3.2  2.2 
Saudi Arabia  15.7  5.0  10  14.5 
South Africa  1.2  -4.4  -4.7  -2.5 
Turkey -2.1  -7.0  -4.3  -4.8 
UK -2.6  -11.6  -13.2  -6.8 
US -2.8  -12.5  -10  -6.7 
Source: IMF, 2009 
  5While there is significant consensus on the need for fiscal stimulus, the magnitude of this increase in 
public sector debt, especially among the advanced economies, has raised considerable concerns (IMF). Table 
3 gives the projections for public sector debt for G20 countries. Higher debt may potentially raise long-term, 
real interest rates, crowding out investment spending and growth, and also potentially raises the prospect of 
higher inflation rates in the future. 
 
Table 3. Gross General Government Debt as a Percentage of GDP 
Country 2007  2009  2010  2014 
Argentina 67.9  60.5  58.1  46.4 
Australia 9.8  16.9  22.7  27.8 
Brazil 66.8  68.5  65.9  58.8 
Canada 64.2  78.2  79.3  68.9 
China 20.2  20.2  22.2  20.0 
France 63.8  78.0  85.4  96.3 
Germany 63.4  78.7  84.5  89.3 
India 80.5  84.7  85.9  78.6 
Indonesia 35.1  35.1  31.2  27.1 
Italy 103.5  115.8  120.1  128.5 
Japan 187.7  218.6  227  245.6 
Korea 29.6  34.9  39.4  35.4 
Mexico 38.2  47.8  47.9  44.3 
Russia 7.4  7.2  7.7  7.2 
Saudi Arabia  18.5  14.5  12.5  9.3 
South Africa  28.5  48.1  49.6  52.8 
Turkey 39.4  48.1  49.6  52.8 
UK 44.1  68.7  81.7  98.3 
US 61.9  84.8  93.6  108.2 
Source: IMF, 2009 
 
In the analysis below, we only discuss a short-term model, abstracting from the long-run costs of fiscal 
deficits. The key aim of this paper is to show how deficits may have dramatically different effects in the short 
run, regardless of whether the economy is in a liquidity trap or not. While we do not dismiss the dangers of 
increasing public sector debt, at least for the larger economies, these dangers lie more in the future than the 
present. For now, the path of both long-term interest rates and inflationary expectations in most advanced 
economies suggest little concern about unsustainable debt levels or high future inflation. 
 
2.  THE MODEL OF OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS 
2.1  Demographics and Households 
We employ a very standard Blanchard (1985)-Yaari (1965) model of uncertain lifetimes, in an 
overlapping generation economy. Time is discrete. At any date, a cohort of measure 1 γ −  households is born, 
  6where 01 γ ≤≤ . An individual household dies with probability 1 γ −  in each period, independent of age, so 
that γ is the probability of survival from one period to the next. Thus, the total population at any time t is 
. As in Blanchard’s model, we assume a full annuities market, whereby savers get a 
premium on lending to cover their unintended bequests, and borrowers pay a premium to cover their 
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Here we define   as the consumption in time t  of cohort v , while   is labor supply. Assume that 
,  . Households supply labor in all periods of life, but real wages decline over an 
agent’s lifetime, as suggested by Blanchard and Fischer (1989). We assume that the composite consumption 
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⎥  where θ  is the elasticity of substitution across individual brands. Households 
also derive utility from aggregate government spending, denoted by G . Government spending is taken as 
given by each household, and utility from government spending is separable from utility of consumption  . 
We assume that  ,  . 
t
, tv C
(.) ′ > 0 g′′ g (.) 0 <
We focus on a model without capital, to make the comparison with the standard neo-Keynesian DSGE 
model as clear as possible. Households have only one form of “outside” savings instrument; government 
bonds. The budget constraint in time t  for an agent born in time vt ≤  is 
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  is the consumer price index. Real wages in terms of the 
composite consumption good are denoted , and are cohort-specific, as described below. Profits from firms 
are represented by  . The presence of full annuity markets implies that rates of return are grossed up to 
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Conditions (3)-(4) characterize optimal consumption and labor supply. In addition, the household must choose 
individual brands to minimize expenditure conditional on a given composite consumption. The familiar 















The Euler equation, in conjunction with the household budget constraint, can be represented in the 
“certainty equivalent” representation
3: 
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= =+ ∏ . To re-write (5) in the 
form of a dynamic equation in aggregate consumption, it is necessary to be more specific about the way in 
which wage income evolves over time. Assume that  ,, tv tv t wa w =  and  ,1 tv t v aa a , φ − =  where   is  the 
economy-wide average wage, 
t w
a is a constant normalization, and 01 φ ≤ ≤
4. Thus, relative to the economy-
wide average, the wage of each cohort declines over time. This captures, in a crude way, the declining human 
capital income profile associated with retirement, while still maintaining the ability to aggregate across 
cohorts, central to the Blanchard-Yaari model. In the description of technology below, we will tie this wage 
differential to effective labor productivity differences across time. In addition, to allow for easy aggregation to 
an economy-wide consumption function, we assume that cohort-specific profits and taxes obey the same 
properties as wage income. 
 
2.2 Aggregation 
To represent economy-wide outcomes, we need to aggregate across cohorts. One immediate aggregation 
difficulty arises from (4). Because a) households have different consumption levels, and b) each cohort has a 
                                                 
3  This representation ignores complications due to Jensen's inequality, and is presented simply to give a heuristic account of the 
aggregation process. The analysis of the model is done by first order approximation however, and the solution of the aggregate model is 
exact at this order. Thus, the error has no consequences for the results below. 
4 a is chosen so that when the cohort specific wage is averaged across all currently alive cohorts, it equals the economy wide average 










  8different value for labor productivity in production of final goods, it will not be possible to aggregate (4) 
across generations, in general. To proceed, we then make the following specific functional form assumption: 
,, () tv tv vH H η = .   (6) 
Thus, we assume that the disutility of work is linear in hours worked. In this case, we can aggregate (4) 
directly across all currently alive cohorts. This restricts the analysis somewhat, but provides a simple 
prediction for the impacts of monetary and fiscal policy shocks when nominal interest rates are positive, and 
when full Ricardian equivalence holds. The key question we address is how allowing for both of these 
features (zero-interest rates and non-Ricardian equivalence) to be relaxed together influences policy effects. 
The assumption (6) allows us to write the aggregate labor supply condition as: 
tt Cw η = .   (7) 
The consumption expression (5) may be aggregated across cohorts to give: 
() 0 (1 ) (1 ) ( ) t t t t i i ti ti ti ti Cr B E w H βγ δ
∞
=+ ++ + =− + +Σ + Π−  t ,   (8) 
where now 
1 (1 ) ( )
s t
is st r δγ
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= =+ ∏  φ
t
. 
In aggregate, the budget constraint for all households is: 
1 (1 ) tt t t t t t B rB w H t C + =+ + + Π −−.   (9) 
Note that in the aggregate, there is no γ  term in the flow budget constraint, since the risk premium only 
represents a transfer from one generation to another. 
Then manipulating (8) and (9), we can write the aggregate Euler equation as: 
11
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In contrast to the standard Ramsey model, in this model, the growth in aggregate consumption depends on 
both interest rates and aggregate wealth. When  1 φγ <   and aggregate wealth is positive, aggregate 
consumption growth is lower than in the Ramsey model, because the average household is actually less 




Retail goods firms hire labor and capital to produce their individual brands, using the production 
function: 
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where   is firm  “s composite employment. The expression   
represents the employment by firm i  of household
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  9an identical effective labor productivity  , ts a , captured by the process described above. The idea is that labor 
of different vintages has different efficiencies, and si 1 nce φ < , labor income per unit of effort tends to 
decline over time, for each cohort. This is an important feature of the model, since it gives each generation a 
downward sloping income profile over their planning horizon. In fact, it allows for a greater desire to save on 
the part of each cohort, and moves the model closer to the standard overlapping generations (OLG) model, 
with working and retirement phases of life. 
We abstract from capital accumulation, but allow for the presence of a fixed factor of production, so that 
01 α ≤≤ . Finally,  is a productivity term, common to all firms.  t A
Retail firms are monopolistically competitive, and face an elasticity of demand given by  1 θ >
() t i W
 in each 
period. Firms adjust their prices according to the usual Calvo assumption of a constant probability of price 
change, 1 , however, the previous price changed long ago. When firms adjust their prices, they maximize 
discounted expected profits, where per period profits for each firm   are 
κ −
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2.4 Fiscal  Authority 
The fiscal authority has expenditure commitments arising from net transfers to households and direct 
government spending. For now, we do not separately consider nominal money balances in the model, so there 
is no direct measure of seignoriage revenues. Thus, the fiscal authority obtains revenue simply from net tax 
receipts   and nominal debt issue. The government budget constraint is given by:  t T
1 (1 ) tt t t t TP GB i B + += − +.   (13) 
  10We allow for a number of possible configurations of fiscal policy rules. One such rule is to take the path of 
government spending as exogenously given to the fiscal authority, and adjust the net transfer to achieve a 
given target for the debt to GDP ratio. Alternatively, net transfers could be adjusted to balance the 
government’s budget in every period, maintaining a constant path of (real or nominal) government debt. 
 
2.5 Monetary  Policy 
Assume that the monetary authority follows an interest rate rule, given by: 
1











⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ =+ + − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
,   (14) 
where  t ρ  represents a desired path for the equilibrium real interest rate, π represents a desired path for the 
inflation rate, and   is the target level of aggregate output. We assume that  ˆ Y 1 π σ >  and 0 y σ > . This rule is 
somewhat unrealistic in that we do not allow for interest rate “smoothing”. This is not critical to results, 
however. 
The monetary authority can follow the rule (14) only when  , however. If the rule stipulates a 
negative nominal interest rate, then the central bank is constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal 






tt ii = .   (15) 
 
2.6 Equilibrium  Conditions 
Now, combining (9), (11), and (13) the aggregate resource constraint for the final composite good is: 
1
tt t t t AH Y G C
α − ==+.   (16) 
The zero lower bound condition (15) is usually thought of as a constraint on the short-run behavior of 
monetary policy. But this is not necessarily the case. For instance, if the monetary authority has a low enough 
long-term inflation target, this could force the long-run real interest rate own to the level where the zero 
bound is a binding constraint. Although this has no long-term consequences for output’s path, it does place a 
condition on the required path of real government debt. We explore this issue briefly in the next section. 
 
3. Long-run  Flexible Price Equilibrium 
In a flexible price equilibrium (7) and (12) give the solution for equilibrium aggregate output: 
()
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.   (17) 
From (17), the long-run government spending multiplier is given by 
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≡< . The multiplier is increasing in the steady state ratio of government spending to GDP, but 





=  as the long-run government debt to GDP ratio. For a given value of  , the long-run 
real interest rate is determined by the steady state version of (10): 
y g
(1 )






−= Φ+ ,   (19) 
where 
(1 )(1 )






. The real interest rate is increasing in the steady state government debt-GDP 
ratio. In this model, without capital, government debt does not crowd out real investment, and has no effect on 
steady state aggregate output or consumption. But a higher  increases real interest rates, and tilts the profile 
of each generation’s consumption toward the future. 
y b
The steady state nominal interest rate is obtained from (14), taking the desired real interest rate ρ  as 
constant. 
(1 ) (1 )(1 ), 0 ir i π + = + +      > ,   (20) 
1 (1 ) (1 ) , 0 ri π
− + = +             = .   (21) 
For a given target real interest rate, inflation, and output, there may be more than one inflation rate satisfying 
these conditions, where i  is defined by (15). For instance, one equilibrium is given by  ˆ π π = ,  ˆ YY =  
andi ρ = . But another equilibrium is given by: 
1
1 ˆ 0, (1 )(1 ) 1 i
π π σ σ πρ π
− − ⎡⎤ == + + − ⎣⎦ . 
Benhabib et al. (2002) were the first to demonstrate that Taylor rules will generally be associated with 
multiple equilibrium rates of inflation when nominal interest rates are bounded below by zero. Here we focus 
only on equilibria with positive inflation rates, where the steady state inflation rate is equal to the target rate 
ˆ π
5. In this economy, there is only one such equilibrium consistent with (19) and (15). Thus, we may re-write 
(20) as 
ˆ (1 ) (1 )(1 ), 0 ir i π + = + +      > ,   (22) 
1   ˆ (1 ) (1 ) , 0 ri π
− + = +          = . (23) 
 
                                                 
5 This requires that the authority have a steady-state, target, real interest rate equal to the real interest rate implied by (19), and a steady-
state target for output equal to that implied by (17). 
  12The two conditions (19) and (22) have separate interpretations, depending upon whether the nominal interest 
rate is positive or at the zero lower bound. When  , the conditions determine i  and r  separately, for 
given 
0 i >
ˆ π  and . The steady state monetary rule (14) determines  y b ˆ π , while   is determined by steady state 
fiscal policy, consistent with (13), in conjunction with an appropriate transversality condition. Thus, monetary 
and fiscal policy can be thought of as independent, in a steady state with . Moreover, there is a recursive 
structure, such that the fiscal stance, summarized by the value of  , determines  , while the inflation target 




But (19) and (22) may also be associated with an equilibrium where  0 i = ; and the nominal interest rate 
is at the zero lower bound. From (22), this can occur only if  0 r < ; that is, if the economy is dynamically 
inefficient. From (19), dynamic inefficiency can occur, even when , when 0 y b > 1 φ < . If each cohort has a 
declining wage profile over time, the economy may be dynamically inefficient, even if government debt to 
GDP is positive. 
The behavior of the steady state under the zero lower bound is fundamentally different from that 













Condition (24) defines the sense in which monetary and fiscal policy are interdependent in an economy at the 
zero lower bound.
6 If the government debt-GDP ratio is such that the equilibrium real interest rate is negative, 
then the target rate of inflation must be uniquely determined. Conversely, if the target rate of inflation is taken 
as given, then the debt-GDP ratio must be adjusted to achieve the equilibrium real interest implied by this 
target. Moreover, at the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate, the steady state is no longer recursive. 
A higher value of 
T π  implies a lower (more negative) real interest rate, and must be accompanied by a fall 
in , holding   and all the other variables constant.  y b y g
 




                                                 
6 Leeper (2010) provides an alternative view of the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy, even when nominal interest rates are 
positive, based on the interdependence implied by the public sector budget constraint. 
  13Figure 2 illustrates the trade-off implied by (24). In the Figure,  represents the value of the debt ratio 
for which , implied by (19). For 
y b 
0 r = y bb y <  , the real interest rate is negative. Whether the economy is 
stuck at the zero lower bound depends on the inflation target. The schedule MF illustrates (24). For a given 
 the lower the inflation target, the more likely the economy will be at the zero lower bound. MF 
describes the required values of   for each value of the inflation target, when the economy is stuck at the 
zero lower bound. Thus, in a steady state, there must be a negative relationship between government debt and 
the inflation rate, when the economy is at the zero lower bound.
, y bb < 
y
y b
7 Intuitively, the condition says that, in the 
long run, if monetary authorities are committed to low inflation targets, then low real interest rate episodes are 
likely to push them to the zero bound. If they remain committed by a low inflation target at the zero bound, 
then this really means that they are preventing the real interest rate from falling any further. This can only be 
done through giving up control of the outstanding stock of government debt. Equivalently, if the fiscal 
authority insists on reducing the stock of real debt in an environment where the real interest rate is pushed 
below zero, then the monetary authorities must accommodate this with a higher rate of inflation. In either case, 
with a permanent zero nominal interest rate, there must be a negative relationship between government debt 
and inflation. 
 
4.  Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the Short Run Under a Zero Lower Bound 
We now analyze the model in the short run, when prices adjust as per (12). Like Christiano et al. (2009), 
Woodford and Eggertsson (2003, 2005), and Eggertsson (2009), we wish to explore the usefulness of 
monetary and fiscal policy in responding to an environment where the economy has been pushed to a zero 
lower bound; that is, where the nominal interest rate is stuck at zero for some time. Initially, we will just 
compare the differential effects of policy in the two environments: the first, when the nominal interest rate 
operates according to a standard Taylor rule, and the second, when the nominal interest rate is zero. This gives 
us the basic contrasting results of this section. We later provide a quantitative comparison of the usefulness of 
monetary and fiscal policy alternatives in response to the zero-lower bound constraint. 
Under what circumstances should the policymaker face a zero interest rate constraint? As in the previous 
literature, we may think of this situation as generated by a large increase in the representative agents’ discount 
factor, raising desired savings and pushing down the flexible price equilibrium real interest rate. If the policy 
maker follows a Taylor rule, as in (14), then the nominal interest rate may be pushed down to its lower bound. 
The increase in desired savings leads to a fall in aggregate demand and a fall in the output gap. In normal 
times, the optimal response to this shock would be to reduce nominal interest rates to facilitate the required 
real interest rate adjustment. But when nominal interest rates are zero, they cannot be reduced further. How 
should policy respond? Two main answers have been offered in the literature. Krugman (1998), Jung et al. 
                                                 
7 Beaudry, Devereux and Siu (2009) examine this restriction in a more complete dynamic growth model. Condition (24) abstracts from 
the possibility of bubble equilibria. When the real interest rate is negative, it is possible that other non-fundamental assets may be valued 
in equilibrium, so that total wealth would include both the value of government debt and the bubble asset. 
  14(2005), and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) discuss a range of alternative monetary policy rules that may be 
applied, despite the fact that the interest rate remains at or near zero for some time. The common feature of 
these proposals is that the policy maker should make an announcement about the conduct of monetary policy 
once the economy has left the zero bound region. If the authority announces that policy will remain loose 
even after the zero bound no longer binds, it does so to lessen the deflationary impact of the current shock. 
The obvious difficulty with using monetary policy in this way is that the announcement must be credible for it 
to have any effect on current output and inflation. The policy-maker must follow a history-dependent rule, 
and continue to pursue monetary easing even after the conditions that warrant such easing have faded. 
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) discuss a range of targets for monetary authorities that would replicate the 
optimal history dependent rule, but may be easier to communicate to the public. 
The second main response to a zero lower bound trap is the use of fiscal policy. Fiscal policy may 
directly influence aggregate demand in the traditional Keynesian manner, even when the monetary authority 
cannot reduce interest rates any further. Fiscal policy options for the zero lower bound trap are discussed by 
Christiano et al. (2009), Eggertsson (2009), and Cogan et al. (2009). 
One common characteristic of previous literature analyzing the role of policy at the zero lower bound is 
that models display Ricardian equivalence. Hence, the financing of government spending expansion has no 
role to play, and the real balance effects of monetary policy are not operative. In the recent policy discussion, 
summarized in Section 1, however, the need to run government deficits, generated either by tax cuts or bond-
financed government spending increases, is seen as paramount to the stimulus package in all countries. The 
notion that large fiscal expansion occurring in many countries could just as easily be financed with tax 
increases as with government deficits seems completely at variance with all policy discussion. It is therefore 
important to be able to analyze the impact of fiscal deficits when interest rates are stuck at the zero lower 
bound, and to compare this with the case where interest rates are part of regular monetary policy. The 
advantage of the current model is that we can analyze the role played by tax cuts and spending increases 
separately, and distinguish between debt-financed and tax-financed fiscal expansion. Moreover, we can 
analyze separately the real balance effects of monetary policy, which can operate even at zero interest rates.
8 
 
4.1  Approximating the Model Under a Taylor Rule 
In the case where nominal interest rates are positive and adjust according to (14), we have a standard 
New Keynesian model, save for the presence of government debt in the Euler equation (10). Using (10) and 
(16), we may approximate (10) as follows: 
 ()l
1 11 1 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆˆ () ( tt tt tt t tt t YYiE bE GG πν + ++ + + + =+ − + − Φ − −)
                                                
,   (25) 
 
8 Ireland (2005) emphasizes the “real balance effect” of monetary policy, which can operate even when the nominal interest rate is zero. 
He does so in a purely flexible price model though, similar to the case described in section 2, above. 
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linear approximation is taken around an initial debt-GDP ratio equal to zero,
9 so that  0 b = . The government 
spending shock represents a deviation of government spending from the steady state level, relative to GDP. 
We are assuming that there is an optimal (flexible price equilibrium) level of government spending to given 
by G , and movements in government spending here represent deviations from the optimum. The variable  ˆt ν  
represents a temporary shock to the discount factor, where we assume that the discount factor can be 
represented as exp( ) tt β βν = , and the steady state value of ν , is set at zero;  0 ν = . The departure from 
full Ricardian equivalence is governed by the composite coefficient Φ , which depends on the steady state 
discount rate, the probability of survival, and the time path of labor income within each cohort. 
The forward looking inflation equation follows in standard fashion from the first order approximation of 
















=+ + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ −− ⎝⎠
,   (26) 
where 








. The term in brackets represents the deviation of real marginal cost from 
its steady state level, given the assumptions on the disutility of labor for each generation. 
The linear approximation of the interest rate rule is written as: 
() ˆ R
tt i π y t Y ρ πσπ π σ =++ − + . (27) 
In this section, we assume that , so that the interest rate always follows (27).  0
R
t i >
Finally, we take a linear approximation of the government budget constraint as follows: 







= . Since we are approximating around an initial steady state with a zero debt-GDP ratio, 
this approximation does not depend on the first order dynamics of the real interest rate. On its own however, 
(28) will involve non-stationary dynamics in the government debt-ratio. To avoid this, we assume that the 
fiscal authority chooses a tax rule so that the dynamics of aggregate government debt to GDP are stationary, 
for given government spending movements. In particular, we assume that net taxes have a discretionary and 
an automatic component, such that: 
1 ˆ ˆˆ
tt TTt b =+ t
                                                
,  (29) 
 
y
9 This facilitates the exposition. Allowing for non-zero debt ratios requires the interest rate to be an additional state variable, which 
makes the algebra more complicated, but does not substantially change the results so long as b  is not too large. 
  16where t  is constant, and is chosen such that  1 rt1 ω = +−<. This ensures that following a temporary 
shock to government spending or the discretionary component of taxes which leaves the long-run real primary 
deficit unchanged, the debt level will return to its steady state. 
 
4.2  Shocks to the Discount Factor 
A natural way to think about policy being constrained by the lower bound on interest rates is that an 
increase in the desire to save drives down the equilibrium, flexible price, real interest rate. Under an inflation 
targeting monetary rule, this requires a fall in the nominal interest rate. The variable  ˆt ν , representing a shock 
to the discount factor, increases the ex-ante savings rate of all generations. Assume that  ˆt ν is governed by the 
process: 
11 ˆˆ tt t ν μν ε ++ =+ , 
where 1 () tt E 0 ε + = . An increase in the discount factor leads to a persistent fall in the equilibrium real interest 
rate. Using the interest rate rule (27), the impact of the shock can be obtained from the solution to (25)-(29). 
The increase in the discount factor increases the desire to save, reducing aggregate demand, causing a fall in 
both output and inflation. The responses of output and inflation are given by: 
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, and  (1 )(1 )(1 )) ( ) ) 0 y z μπ α βμ μ σ κ σ μ Δ= − − − + + − >. 
The impact of a discount factor shock is cushioned by interest rates’ endogenous response. The higher the 
interest rate response to inflation and the output gap, the smaller the effect of the shock. In the optimal 
monetary policy framework presented in Woodford (2003), an optimal monetary response that goes beyond 
the interest rate rule can fully accommodate a discount factor shock, reducing nominal interest rates by the 
extent of the shock itself, and fully stabilizing output and inflation. But this requires that authorities have 
sufficient leeway to reduce the nominal interest rate. For large enough shocks, the zero bound on the interest 
rate may apply, and some alternative monetary or fiscal policy must be used to respond to the shock. Before 
we analyze the economy’s response under a zero bound, however, we investigate the impact of fiscal policy 
shocks when the nominal interest rate is positive, and the economy operates under the monetary rule (27). 
 
4.3  Government Spending, Debt and Tax Shocks Under a Taylor Rule 
Previous papers have analyzed the effects of government spending shocks in this type of model. The only 
difference here from the previous literature is the failure of Ricardian equivalence, and the effects of 
government debt accumulation. To highlight this difference, we first examine the impact of a one-off shock to 
  17government debt. It is easy to solve (25)-(29) to show that the effect of an increase in  t b  on output and 
inflation is as follows: 

















,  (33) 
where (1 )(1 )(1 )) ( ) ) 0 y z ωπ α βω ω σ κ σ ω Δ= − − − + + − >
n increase in wealth for currently alive cohorts. This l
. An increase in government debt is 
perceived as a eads to an increase in consumption and a 
fall in desired saving. Current aggregate demand rises, pushing up inflation. The rise in inflation increases the 
real interest rate, via the interest rate rule, partly offsetting the impact of the higher debt on current output. 
The greater the response to inflation or the output gap in the interest rate rule, the greater the increase in the 
real interest rate, and the smaller the impact on output and inflation. Note also that the impact of a debt shock 
depends on the persistence in government debt generated by the government budget constraint. If the debt-
sensitive tax rule is such that an initial debt shock is very transitory (i.e. ω very low), the impact on output or 
inflation is small. 
We can now focus on the effects of government spending and taxes. To provide a benchmark comparison 
with
pending increase by the same amount. In both 
case
 the Ricardian equivalence case, we focus first on a government spending expansion financed by a tax 
increase, that is, we calculate the balanced budget multiplier. 
Assume that both discretionary taxes and government s
s, assume that after the initial increase, both discretionary taxes and spending converge back to their 
steady state levels at the rateμ . Then, from (25)-(29), we may compute that: 






,   (34) 












The first thing to note about (34) is that it is independent of Φ , the coefficient on government debt in the 
 t aggregate Euler equation. The balanced budget multiplier is he same as that of the standard Ricardian 
equivalence model, because the policy has no consequences for government debt. In addition, the multiplier is 
clearly less than unity. That is: 
ˆ Y




π βμ α σ ακ σ μ ⎡⎤ −= − − − + − < ⎣⎦ . 
Even though prices are sticky and adjust slowly to changes in aggregate demand, the balanced budget 
multiplier is actually less than that of the purely flexible, price equilibrium multiplier. The key reason is that 
under the (27) monetary policy rule, the real interest rate increases so much in response to a rise in fiscal 
  18spending (financed by taxation) that aggregate private consumption falls. Only in the special case of constant 
returns in production(0 ) α =  and no output gap in the interest rate rule (0 ) y σ =  will the multiplier be 
exactly unity, that is, e hat of the flexible price equilibrium. 
This suggests that if the nominal interest rate is free to a
qual to t
djust and follows a standard rule (27), 
gove
 budget government expansion on inflation is given by (35). If
rnment spending is a particularly inefficient way to stimulate the economy. The most that a fiscal 
expansion can do is to leave aggregate private consumption unchanged, and in general consumption will fall. 
Equivalently, we can say that government spending expansion increases output, but output actually falls 
below the level it would attain in a flexible price equilibrium, in the face of the same balanced budget 
government spending increase. 
The impact of a balanced   0 y σ =  
and 0 α = , the inflation rate is unchanged, because output responds exactly as in a flexible price equilibriu  
With ant returns (0 )
m.
 const α =  and  0 y σ > , inflation will fall, since output is below the flexible price 
equilibrium. 
We now turn to the analysis of a tax cut in the model with an interest rate rule. A temporary discretionary 
tax cut will increase the primary government deficit and cause a persistent increase in government debt. How 
will this affect GDP? From (25)-(29) we can establish that: 




β ω σ μ σ β μ − − −
=− Φ
ΔΔ
.   (36) 
Note that with Ricardian equivalence, where 0 Φ =
nd side
, this is negative by definition. For , we would  0 Φ>
re cont anticipate that the expression on the right ha  of (36) is negative (tax increases a ractionary). 
Interestingly however, this is not necessarily true in this model. Take the case where μ  and ω  are very close 
to unity (tax cuts are highly persistent, and the deficit is very slow to fall). Then expression (3  is positive for 
1 π
6)
σ > , and therefore a cut in taxes will reduce GDP in the economy where the interest rate follows a Taylor 
W
rule! 
hat is the explanation for this? The reason is that, for  π σ  greater than unity, and sufficiently large, a 
tax   to cut causes a large offsetting increase in interest rates, due  its inflationary effects. The impact of a tax 
cut on current inflation is always positive, and given by: 
(1 )(1 ) ˆ y z π ˆtt zT
μω




A very persistent tax cut signals a persistent increase in future government debt, which causes the forecast of 
given by (14), tax cuts are unlikely to be an effective stabilization tool. 
future inflation to rise, increasing current inflation, and pushing current interest rates upward. This secondary 
effect can be large enough to reduce aggregate demand and lead to a fall in output. Thus, again, we may 
conclude that during “normal times”, when the nominal interest rate follows a conventional rule of the type 
  19Note that we have not yet given a quantitative analysis of the effects of tax cuts and government spending 
policies in this model. In the discussion of the calibrated model below, we show that for both policies, the 
mul
Fiscal Policies Under a Zero Lower Bound 
Now assume that the shock to the discount factor is large enough to push the economy into a liquidity 
hu zero lower bound.
10 In this case, the economy’s 
dyn
. By contrast, here we will focus on a situation where the lower bound constraint is 
tem
he economy to the zero lower bound for an uncertain 
num




trap: t s, the nominal interest rate is constrained by the 
amics are fundamentally different. The effects of the initial shock and policy measures to count the shock 
on inflation and the output gap operate through substantially different channels when the policy interest rate 
cannot respond. 
In section 2 above, we analyzed the properties of a steady state in which the nominal interest rate is at the 
zero lower bound
porary, the rise in the discount factor dissipates over time, and the economy‘s real interest rate returns to 
its steady state. In a crude way, this captures the impact of an aggregate demand shock coming from an 
unanticipated temporary rise in the savings rate.
11 
To make the analysis concrete, we follow Eggertsson and Woodford (2003, 2005) and Eggertsson (2009) 
in assuming that the discount factor shock drives t
ber of periods. We assume a one-time shock to the discount factor that continues, with probability μ  per 
period. So in each future period, the discount factor reverts to the steady state with probability 1 μ − . In the 
intervening time, the discount factor is at its post-shock level, and is sufficiently high that the policy im lied 
by the original interest rate rule would require a zero interest rate. As in Eggertsson an oodford 
(2003,2005), Eggertsson (2009), and Christiano et al. (2009), we investigate both the impact of the original 
shock, and the impact of an alternative series of monetary and fiscal policies, when the economy operates at 
the zero interest rate bound. 





= , under the assumption that the shock reverts back to steady 
















10 To ensure that the approximations remain accurate at the zero lower bound, it is necessary to restrict the size of the discount factor 
shock placing the economy at the bound. See Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). 
11 In the case of a permanent zero lower bound, the conditions for a unique stable path of adjustment of inflation, output and government 
debt are not always met.  In particular, in the Ricardian equivalence version of this model (whenΦ =
0
), the conditions for uniqueness 
in the zero interest rate case are not met for familiar reasons (e.g. Clarida et al. 1999). But with Φ >  and allowing for a non-zero, 
initial, nominal government debt, there is a ‘real balance effect’ which may be sufficient to restore uniqueness (Ireland 2005), even if the 
nominal interest rate is stuck at zero forever. Nevertheless, because we are primarily concerned with the analysis of short run stabilization 
policies, we follow the recent literature and analyze the (somewhat more realistic) case of a temporary liquidity trap. 







.  (39) 
(1 )(1 )(1 )
z z μ α βμ μ κμ Δ= − − − − . A condition for stability is that  0
z
μ Δ >
and (38), a 
ned by t
where 
12. Note how that 
. Hence, in comparing (30)  rise in the discount 
h
etary a








y z μμ π αβ μ σ σ κ μ Δ= − − + >
oth inflation and the outpu
 not surprising, and follows as a co
0 Δ−
This is nv
factor will affect b t gap more in an economy constrai e zero lower bound. 
erse argument to the logic presented above, regarding the 
response of inflation and the output gap under an interest rate rule. Since the nominal interest rate cannot 
respond, the fall in demand reduces output, which reduces inflation and, given the shock’s persistence, the fall 
in anticipated inflation pushes up the real interest rate, pushes demand down further, and reduces output even 
more. So long as 0
z
μ Δ>, this process converges, but to a much lower level of output than would occur under 
a positive interest rate rule. 
How do mon nd fiscal policies operate when the interest rate is zero? Again, we focus on the 
importance of debt- and defi
analysis. To simplify our analysis and make comparison with the previous section easier, we initially 
make the special assumption that fiscal policies enacted while the economy is constrained by the zero lower 
bound are completely eliminated, when the constraint is no longer binding, and the economy then reverts 
immediately to its steady state. This involves the assumption with a return to positive interest rates, taxes are 
raised to completely eliminate the accumulated government debt resulting from fiscal policy expansions. 
Thus, government debt built up over and above its initial steady state (or zero) is wiped out, and debt 
reverts to zero after the return to positive interest rates. This allows the economy to return to a steady s
 assumption makes the algebraic comparison with the previous section very simple, but it is not a critical 
feature of the argument. We explore an alternative case below, where the accumulated debt is eliminated 
gradually, after the return to positive nominal interest rates. We can see that all the points made in this section 
remain valid. In fact, because the cohorts holding the accumulated debt continue to treat it as net wealth after 
the return to positive interest rates, this alternative path of convergence reinforces the impact of current fiscal 
policies. 
First, we can analyze the impact of an arbitrary rise in government debt, in a manner similar to (32) and 
(33) abov
(1 )(1 ) ˆ
t z b ˆ
t Y
ωμ
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,  (41) 
(1 )(1 )(1 )) z ωμ α βμω ωμ κμω Δ=− − − − .  where  Again, for stability, it is necessary that
                                                
0 ωμ Δ> . 
 
12 See Eggertsson (2009). 
  21As in the case of a positive nominal rate, an increase in government debt leads to a rise in the output gap 
and the inflation rate, so long as Ricardian equivalence fails  ) (0 Φ >
r, in this ex
. The quantitative impact may be 
r less than (32) and (33). On the one hand, th  here, lea g to 
a larger impact on both inflation and the output gap. Howeve periment, the interest rate rule reverts 
back to (14) with probabilit
greater o e nominal interest rate does not respond din
y 1 μ − . The quantitative analysis b at the effects of increasing 





If a rise in the discount factor affects the output gap more negatively in a liquidity trap, it is reasonable to 
think that compensating fiscal policies could prove more able to stabilize the economy, since in this 
environment an expansion in  rnment spending or a tax cut does not elicit automatic interest rate 
responses that limit fiscal instruments. In this vein, Christiano et al. (2009) and Eggertsson (2009) sho
ernment spending policies may have significantly higher multiplier effects in a liquidity trap than during 
normal times. But again, their analysis was confined to the situation of full Ricardian equivalence, where a 
balanced budget expansion in government spending is identical to a debt-financed expansion. We now wish to 
revisit this question, allowing for debt versus tax-financed spending policies to have different effects. As a 
corollary, we can investigate the effect of tax cuts compared to government spending expansions, as we did 
above for the case outside the liquidity trap. 
Using (25)-(29) we can establish that a balanced budget increase in government spending has the 
following impacts on the output gap and inflation: 
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(1 )(1 )(1 ) z α βμ μ κμ −− − −
whenever (1 ) 0 y g
. From (42) we see that the multiplier effect on output exceed   s unity,
α −> . Hence, 
liquidity trap than when the nom
multiplier is not necessarily large
the balanced budget government spending multiplier is always greater in a 
inal interest rate is positive and responds according to a Taylor rule. But the 
. When 0 α = , the multiplier is exactly unity: a balanced budget expansion 
has no im vate consumption. Moreover, the inflationary effects of a balanced budget 
absence of endogenous interest rate adjustment to the output gap (i.e.  0 y
pact whatsoever on pri
increase in spending also exceed thos e Taylor rule. This is for two reasons: first, because in the  e under th
σ = ), the multiplier impacts of 
shocks are greater in the zero lower bound economy, since
z
μμ Δ <Δ . Moreover, when  0 y σ > , as we saw in 
expression (34) above, the interest rate response to a government spending increase in the Taylor rule 
economy will mitigate the impact on inflation, something that does no n in the zero lower bound 
economy. 
t happe
  22In the economy with the Taylor rule, we saw, paradoxically, that a tax-financed spending increase could 
be more or less expansionary than the equivalent deficit-financed increase. In the recent rounds of stimulus 
packages applied in many countries, an important feature of spending policies was that they were financed by 
debt issue rather than tax increases. In fact, the essential rationale behind this intervention was to combine 
spending increases with tax cuts, to stimulate overall spending. The perception was that when nominal interest 
rates cannot be lowered, this becomes the last possible channel for stabilization policy. Again however, in the 
context of our framework, this only makes sense if Ricardian equivalence fails. To examine this argument, we 
now focus on the effects of tax cuts in the model constrained by the zero lower bound. Again, using (25)-(29), 
we can derive the responses of the output gap and inflation as: 
l l





αα ω μ β ω μ β ω μ ⎡⎤ − Φ −− −−+ ⎣⎦ =
ΔΔ
, (44) 









t . (45) 
The expression in (44) is always negative. Hence, in contrast to the case with positive interest rates, tax cuts 
are always expansionary at the zero
private sector wealth, leading to a fall in private saving and an increase in aggregate demand and output. Tax 
on 
resented in Table 4. The parameter values are quite standard and follow the assumptions made in the recent 
ture tions we have made to allow for aggregation in the OLG 
mod
 lower bound, so long as Ricardian equivalence fails. Tax cuts increase 
cuts also make government debt grow more. At the same time, tax cuts are inflationary, as the output gap 
increases in response to the increase in aggregate demand, as confirmed by (45). Unlike the case where the 
Taylor rule applies, however, there is no compensating increase in the policy interest rate resulting from the 
increase in inflation. This raises the possibility that tax cuts may be substantially more expansionary in an 
economy stuck at the zero lower bound. To assess the validity of the arguments for deficit financing as an 
important stabilization tool, then, we must turn to a quantitative assessment of the strength of these effects. 
 
4.5  Quantitative Comparison of Policies 
How big are the effects of fiscal policy in the economy within a liquidity trap? We take the calibrati
p
litera  in this area, save for the particular assump
el (log utility, and linear disutility of leisure). We look at two versions of each model, one with constant 
returns to scale and another with decreasing returns to labor, assuming that 0.3 α = . In the first model, we 
follow Christiano et al. (2009) in setting the discount factor at 0.99, while the Calvo price adjustment is 
parameter κ   at 0.85, so that 0.028 λ = . In the second version, with 0.3 α = , the definition of λ  is 
different, so we choose κ  at a different value (0.7), and  10 θ = , so as to repr 0.025 oduceλ = . We initially 
set the parameters of the interest rate rule at  1.5 π σ =  and  0 y σ = , but we also look at variations on these 
settings. In addition we set the steady state governme ng ratio equal to  ximately the 
relevant value for the U onomy. 
nt spendi 0.15, appro
S ec
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Table 4. Parameter Values 
Β 0.985 
Φ 0.011 
Λ .028,  .025 










The parameters governing the  ort time-horizon are very impo ng the degree to which 
government deficits have any affe n real allocations. It is well kn hat if the household planning 
horizon in the Blanchard-Yaari mo is too great, then the results are q tatively equivalent to a model 
with
coh rtant in assessi
ct o own t
del  uanti
 an infinite horizon (e.g. Evans 1991). As a result, the quantitative literature on the impacts of deficits 
using the Blanchard-Yaari model usually interprets the probability of death in a broader manner than that 
implied by straightforward demographic data. Bayoumi and Sgherri (2008) directly estimate the Blanchard-
Yaari parameters from a reduced form consumption function from the model, and find estimates of γ  below 
0.8 at an annual frequency. This implies a five-year horizon for consumers in their planning decision. We 
choose γ  to match this at the quarterly frequency. On parameter φ , governing the rate of earnings decline 
over the lifetime, we have little direct evidence to match this. We simply make a rough estimate base  on the 
fact that agents spend about two-thirds of their adult lives working and one-third retired, so we set  0.6
d
φ = . 
In comb ation with the assumption for  in β , these assumptions imp that  ly  Φ  is about 0.011 at the quarterly 
frequency. We should note that this calibration is not guaranteed to enlarge the impact of government deficits. 
Even with these assumptions about the planning horizon and wage distribution, we show that the e f 




μ , governing the number of periods for which it is anticipated that the zero lower bound 
on interest rate will apply, is a critical feature of the dynamics. If this is too large, then the stability condition 
is not satisfied. We set 0.8 μ = , so that nominal interest rates are anticipated to be zero for five quarters.
13 To 
com co
                                                
pare with the e nomy under the Taylor rule, we assume that all shocks in that case have persistence 






13 This is not a necessary feature of the solution. We could allow the zero lower bound to be operative for a finite but known number of 
periods, after which the economy converges back to steady state. In this case, the duration of the zero interest rate phase could be 
arbitrarily extended. 
  24Table 5. Simulation results 
Taylor Rule Model 
  ˆ v  ˆ b   ˆ G   ˆ ˆ GT −   ˆ T  
ˆ Y   -3.2 0.04 1.07  1  -0.07 
ˆ π   -.05 0.01 0.07  0  -0.07 
ˆ R   -.36 0.   0  -0.03 
Zero L wer Bound Model 
01 0.03
o
ˆ Y   -13.8 0.05 2.01  1  -1.01 
ˆ π   -2.68 0.01 0.23  0  -0.23 
ˆ R   2.15 -0.0 -0.19  0  0.19 
 
Table 5 presents q ive results   the eff f policies und the Taylor ru  the 
economy constrained by ower bo on interest rat  the baseline calibration, we see  the 
impact of a discount factor shock in the economy at the zero lower bound is orders of magnitude more than in 
an e omy operating under a Taylor rule. This shock increases the desire to save, reducing current demand, 
outp
uantitat comparing ects o er  le with
 the zero l und  es. In  that
con
ut and inflation. In the economy operating under a Taylor rule, the nominal interest rate will fall, pushing 
down the real interest rate and reducing the incentive to save. The equilibrium real interest rate falls. In 
contrast, when the nominal interest rate cannot respond, the way the increased desired savings is satisfied in 
equilibrium is for current output to fall relative to expected future output. But the fall in current output leads 
to a fall in current inflation, which raises the real interest rate, increasing the desire to save. When 1 μ < , and 
the stability conditions on the model under the zero lower bound are satisfied, this process has an eventual 
equilibrium leading to a very large fall in current output. 
The second panel of Table 5 illustrates the impact of fiscal policies in both interest rate scenarios, under 
the baseline calibration with  0 α =  (constant returns to scale). In both cases, the balanced budget iplier 
is unity. Even though the impact of demand shocks is potentially much greater in the zero lower bound 
economy, in which the real interest rate may respond pat
 mult




the scale of the responses differs dramatically between the Taylor rule economy and the zero lower bound 
 interest rate responses at all. When the government spending expansion is financed by current taxation, 
there is no consequence at all vernment debt. Output responds one for one to the expansion in both the 
current period and all future periods in which expansion continues. Consumption is unaffected. As a result, 
there is no need for real interest to move. Thus, under this calibration, the zero lower bound has no 
implications at all for the effects of balanced budget fiscal expansions (although as we see below, this 
conclusion may be substantially altered under different monetary rules or decreasing returns to scale). 
Now, take the same calibration, but assume that the government spending expansion is deficit-financed. 
Both government spending and government debt increase simultaneously. This rise in government debt leads 
to a wealth-induced increase in private consumption, as in the aggregate, households save less. As a result, the 
government spending multiplier exceeds unity in the economy with both positive and zero interest ra
  25econ
nsionary effects in a liquidity trap, deficit-financed spending is far more 
expa
P, output rises just 0.08% 
of G
Ta
omy. In the Taylor rule case, growth in aggregate demand pushes up inflation, which in turn leads to a 
rise in the real interest rate. This substantially reduces the impact of government debt on private consumption. 
The government spending multiplier rises from unity under a balanced budget expansion to only 1.07 in the 
economy with deficit financing. 
In the economy constrained by the zero lower bound, the inflation generated by the increased government 
spending leads to a fall in the real interest rate. This substantially increases the government spending 
multiplier. In the baseline case, the multiplier rises from unity under a balanced budget expansion to 
approximately 2 under deficit financing of government spending. Thus, while tax-financed government 
spending has no additional expa
nsionary. When the economy is constrained by the zero lower bound, there is a very large difference in 
the predicted effects of fiscal expansions depending on whether they are financed with debt or with taxes. 
Deficit spending has a much greater impact on output than tax-financed spending. 
An immediate corollary of these results is that the impact of pure tax cuts, holding the path of 
government spending fixed, is substantially different in the Taylor rule economy to that constrained by the 
zero lower bound. In the first case, tax cuts generate expansion by increasing private wealth and raising 
aggregate household saving. Although the economy does not exhibit Ricardian equivalence under the Taylor 
rule, the scale of the response to tax cuts is very small. With a tax cut of 1% of GD
DP. Hence as a first approximation, the economy with a Taylor rule has negligible departures from 
Ricardian equivalence, and tax reductions have little stimulatory effect. 
In contrast, at the zero lower bound, tax cuts have a major effect. A tax cut of 1% of GDP increases 
output by about 1% of GDP: the tax multiplier is unity. Although they leave the present discounted value of 
government tax revenues unchanged, tax cuts increase perceived lifetime wealth for currently alive 
generations. This increases current demand and output. But this in turn boosts inflation, causing real interest 
rates to fall, and further increasing present aggregate demand. 
 
ble 6. Simulation results for the Taylor Rule Model (σy=0.25) 
  ˆ v  ˆ b   ˆ G   ˆ ˆ GT −   ˆ T  
ˆ Y   -1.75 0.02  .59  .56  -.03 
ˆ π   -.3 0.01  -0.04  0  -.035 
ˆ R   -.36 0.01  0.035  0  -0.035 
 
One aspect of the model that seems somewhat counterfactual is inflation’s responses i a zero low  
ound. Since inflation is purely f  looking in the  policies significantl uence infl  
even in a liquidity trap. In fact, fiscal policies influence inflation more   interest rates than und
Taylor rule. We could improve the model’s performance in this respect by introducing some backward 
look g elements into the inflation process. 
n  er
b orward model, fiscal  y infl ation,
with zero er a 
in
  26Table 6 also provides some alternative calibrations. In particular, if the interest rate rule is extended to 
allow for the output gap, setting 0.25 y σ = , a value close to empirical estimates, then the multiplier impact 
of all shocks on the output gap is scaled down in the economy governed by the interest rate rule, but the 
results under the zero lower bound are completely unaffected. The impact of a discount factor shock on output 
is smaller, because nominal and real interest rates respond more to the shock. The government spending 
multip
w deflatio
lier is also reduced, because real interest rates rise more in response to the shock. Interestingly, the 
government spending shock is no nary, because the decline in household consumption causes real 
marginal costs to fall. Moreover, tax cuts become even less expansionary in this case than in the baseline 
calibration. 
Table 7 illustrates the case with decreasing returns to scale, setting 0.3 α = , approximately the measure 
of capital income share, with an alternative calibration forκ . Shocks’ impact output changes significantly 
under both interest rate scenarios. Under a Taylor rule, both discount factor shocks and fiscal shocks affect the 
output gap less. This is because with decreasing returns to scale, the output gap’s influence on inflation is 
greater. This triggers greater compensating responses from nominal and real interest rates, reducing the real 
effe ess than
Ta
cts of shocks. Again, the government deficit spending multiplier is l  unity, and the impact of tax 
cuts is only half that of the baseline case. 
 
ble 7. Simulation Results  
Taylor Rule Model (α=0.3) 
  ˆ v  ˆ b   ˆ G   ˆ ˆ GT −   ˆ T  
ˆ Y   -3.0 0.032  0.94  0.89  -0.05 
ˆ π   -0.57 0.01  0.1  0.03  -0.07 
ˆ R   -0.72 0.01  0.027  0  -0.027 
Zero Lower Bound Model 
ˆ Y   -2 0.06  3.62  1.86  -1.7 1  6 
ˆ π   -4.0 0.01  0.58  0.215  -0.36 
ˆ R   4.14 -0.01  -0.6  -0.21  0.39 
 
In contrast, introducing decreasing returns dramatically magnifies the effects of government spending 
policies in the economy with a ze wer bound. The  budget plier now ses to 1.
deficit spending multiplier is 3.6, and the tax cut mu r is 1.8. In th case, fiscal  ansions affect 
inflation more, as marginal cost is more responsive to output movements. This increases the negative impact 
on real interest rates, generating a much larger expansion in equilibrium output. 
ro lo balanced   multi  increa 9. The 
ltiplie is  exp
To some extent, the very substantial responses of real variables under the zero lower bound arise from the 
model’s lack of capital. It would be interesting to extend the model to allow for endogenous capital 
accumulation. The results of Christiano et al. (2009), however, suggest that this would not alter the main 
  27message of this paper: that there is likely to be a very big difference between tax-financed spending and debt-
financed spending in an economy where the nominal interest rate is stuck at zero. 
Ta
 
ble 8. Simulation Results for Zero Lower Bound Model with Gradual Debt Elimination 
  ˆ v  ˆ b   ˆ G   ˆ ˆ GT −   ˆ T  
ˆ Y   -13.7 0.12  3.72  1  -2.72 
ˆ π   -2.68 0.02  0.635  0  -0.635 
ˆ R   2.15 0.02  -0.533  0  0.533 
 
 
We have assumed that all the debt accumulated during the zero lower bound phase is immediately retired, 
following a return to positive interest rates. This makes aring the t es of positi and zero i
rates simple to present. What if we ption, that d gra ually, according
to the rule described by (29)? In that case, the multiplie effects of debt are larger than under the baseline case 
abov wn in Table 8. While the balanced budget multiplier is still unity, the deficit financing multiplier 
is ov
 this case, the 
nly way monetary policy can be used in a liquidity trap is by the announcement of an expansionary monetary 
eturns to positive nominal interest rates. These policies have been 
expl
                                                
 comp wo cas ve  nterest 
 make the alternative assum  debt is retire d  
r 
e, as sho
er 3, and the tax cut multiplier is over 2. Because debt is expansionary, even in an economy with positive 
interest rates, the expectation of higher debt in the future is even more expansionary. Note, however, that 
unlike the previous case, when the impacts of fiscal policy under the zero lower bound do not depend on the 
parameters of the interest rate rule at all, these effects will be influenced by the rule. The more sensitive the 
interest rate to the inflation rate or the output gap in the future, after the Taylor rule has been restored, the 
smaller will be the multiplier effects of current debt-financed government spending or tax cuts. 
 
4.6  Monetary Policy Options 
In the standard New Keynesian model discussed by Christiano et al. (2009), Woodford and Eggertsson 
(2003, 2005), Eggertsson (2009), monetary policy has no direct leverage once the economy is at the zero 
lower bound, since monetary policy is described completely by the use of an interest rate rule. In
o
policy to follow, after the economy r
ored extensively by Woodford and Eggertsson (2003) and by Jung et al. (2005). In the current model 
however, monetary policy can exercise additional leverage, thanks to a “real balance” effect.
14 The monetary 
authority can print currency or increase bank reserves, and thereby increase public sector liabilities. At the 
zero lower bound, this is equivalent to issuing debt. Since the experiment we examined above involved 
issuing debt to finance tax cuts (or spending expansion), a condition that is retired once the economy returns 
to a positive nominal interest rate, it turns out that the impact of a debt-financed tax cut described above is 
equivalent to increasing the money base to finance fiscal transfers to the private sector, and then having this 
operation reversed once the economy returns to a positive nominal interest rate. Thus, to the extent that deficit 
 
14 See Ireland (2005) for an analysis of this lever of monetary policy in an OLG model with flexible prices. 
  28financing of tax cuts is an effective macroeconomic tool in dealing with a zero interest rate environment, this 
is also true of monetary policy expansion, as described.
15. 
Quantitatively, however, it is immediately obvious that the real balance effect cannot significantly affect 
real GDP. For instance, take a monetary policy operation which directly increases M1, by augmenting the 
money base. In the US, money base has more than doubled in the past two years, as a result of the emergency 
procedures implemented by the Fed. But the total net wealth effects of this have been negligible since even 
afte
y interest rates. We show 
at deficit-financed government spending may be far more expansionary than tax-financed, under these 
nce between the two is small during “normal” times, when the policy rate is 
gove
crease in government debt can be Pareto improving. But this 
argu
                                                
r recent operations, M1 and Money base represent very small fractions of total US, private sector, net 
wealth. Thus, the impact of monetary operations via direct real balance effects alone would account for small 
fractions of the debt multipliers reported in Tables 4-8. As a result, while in principle the model allows for a 
real balance effect of monetary policy, practically speaking, even in a liquidity trap, increasing monetary 
aggregates alone would have very small effects, as measured by the present model. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has analyzed the impact of government spending, tax cuts, and government deficits in an 
economy where monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound on polic
th
conditions, even if the differe
rned by a Taylor rule. From a different perspective, this paper makes the case that tax cuts alone may be 
highly expansionary in a liquidity trap, even if they have almost no impact on aggregate demand during 
normal times. The results have some substantial implications for the recent debate about the design of fiscal 
stimulus programs to respond to the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. It has been argued that successful fiscal 
stimulus requires direct government spending rather than tax cuts. The results here suggest that deficit-
financed tax cuts alone can be quite successful in targeting aggregate demand. To the extent that a large part 
of the downturn in the real economy came from a substantial increase in the savings rate, pushing the 
equilibrium real interest rate below zero, the increase in government debt provided by tax cuts may provide a 
direct vehicle for private sector saving. This staunches deflationary forces and prevents the perverse response 
of real interest rates following the initial shock. 
One important issue not analyzed here is the welfare consequences of fiscal policy. There are a number of 
subtle and difficult features associated with welfare evaluation in the present model. First, the model allows 
for dynamic inefficiency, which in this context, implies that the steady state, net real interest rate may be 
negative. In that case, it is well known that an in
ment is not relevant for the analysis of section 4, since the fall in real interest rates in our experiment is a 
temporary phenomenon. Secondly, an analysis of welfare in the present model would be limited, because the 
model does not incorporate capital accumulation. Thus, this analysis does not consider the standard crowding 
out effect of government debt on the long-run capital stock. As discussed in section 3 above, government debt 
 
15 Note that this is not equivalent to an “unconventional” monetary policy, whereby the Central Bank purchases private sector obligations 
with government debt. Our model does not have enough heterogeneity or the presence of risk premia to allow for a complete analysis of 
such an operation. 
  29has no impact on steady state output or consumption, but simply increases the steady state, real interest rate, 
tilting the time profile of spending for each generation. Thus, it is likely that this analysis would also miss any 
first order effects of government debt on steady state welfare. 
Nevertheless, welfare may still be increased using several fiscal policy instruments, even when the 
economy is in a liquidity trap. In particular, Christiano et al. (2009) show that in a liquidity trap, an increase 
in direct government spending above the flexible price optimum value of spending can increase welfare. 
Pursuing this analysis in our model is more difficult, because we do not have a natural social welfare function 
with
r Open Market Operations in a Liquidity Trap,” 
American Economic Review. 
Bayoumi, Tamim, and Silvia Sgherri, (2008), “M reat Adventure: Estimating Fiscal Multipliers 
in a Truly Intertemporal Model,” CEPR Dis 5839. 
 of 
Cés ) “Heterodox Central Banking,” Central 
Chri gio Rebelo, (2009) “When is the Government Spending 
Coc Fiscal Stimulus, Fiscal Inflation, or Fiscal Fallacies,” mimeo. 
nite 
Cog  Cwik, John Taylor, and Volker Wieland, (2009) “New Keynesian Versus Old Keynesian 
Egg he Zero Interest Bound and Optimal Monetary Policy,” 
Egg  is Effective at Zero Interest Rates?,” FRBNY. 
 which to compare utilities across generations. Calvo and Obstfeld (1989) demonstrate that if a 
government in the Blanchard-Yaari economy has access to a full menu of redistributional fiscal instruments, 
the social welfare function in the economy becomes equivalent to that of the Cass-Koopmans neoclassical 
growth model. In that case, we can directly apply the results of Christiano et al. (2009) to establish that 
government spending expansion could increase welfare in our model, when the economy is in a liquidity trap. 
But in such an environment (i.e. using the results of Calvo and Obstfeld 1989), there is no longer a deviation 
from Ricardian equivalence, so the main focus of interest in the present paper would be lost. Analysis of the 
impact of short-run stabilization policy on welfare while incorporating departures from Ricardian equivalence 
would require both a social welfare function, which takes into account intergenerational heterogeneity, and a 
means of approximating this function, along the lines of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). Clearly the full 
exploration of short-run welfare trade-offs in the present model represents an interesting research question. 
Nevertheless, we defer such an analysis to future research. 
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